quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Abstract I examine decentralization through the lens of the local dynamics that it unleashes. The national effects of decentralization are simply the sum of its local-level effects. Hence to understand decentralization we must first understand how local government works. This paper proposes a theory of local government as the confluence of two quasi-markets and one organizational dynamic. Good government results when these three elements -political, economic and civil -are in rough balance, and actors in one cannot distort the others. Specific types of imbalance map into specific forms of government failure. I use comparative analysis to test the theory's predictions with qualitative and quantitative evidence from Bolivia. The combined methodology provides a higher-order empirical rigor than either approach can alone. The theory proves robust.
Introduction
Over the past few decades decentralization has become one of the most debated policy issues throughout both developing and developed worlds. It is seen as central to the development efforts of countries as far afield as Chile, China, Guatemala and Nepal. And in the multiple guises of subsidiarity, devolution and federalism it is also squarely in the foreground of policy discourse in the US, UK and EU. But surprisingly, there is little agreement concerning the effects of decentralization in the empirical literature. Optimists (e.g. Ostrom et al. 1993 , Putnam 1993 , World Bank 1994 , UNDP 1993 argue that decentralization can make government more responsive to the governed by "tailoring levels of consumption to the preferences of smaller, more homogeneous groups" (Wallis and Oates 1988, 5) . Pessimists (e.g. Crook and Sverrisson 1999 , Samoff 1990 , Smith 1985 , Solnick 1996 dispute this, arguing that local governments are too susceptible to elite capture, and too lacking in technical, human and financial resources, to produce a heterogeneous range of public services that are both reasonably efficient and responsive to local demand. But neither side has been able to win over the other with convincing empirical evidence.
Consider the broadest surveys of decentralization experiences. In their wide-ranging 1983 survey, Rondinelli, Cheema and Nellis note that decentralization has seldom, if ever, lived up to expectations. Most developing countries implementing decentralization experienced serious administrative problems. Although few comprehensive evaluations of the benefits and costs of decentralization efforts have been conducted, those that were indicate limited success in some countries but not others. A decade and a half later, surveys by Piriou-Sall (1998) , Manor (1999) and Smoke (2001) come to cautiously positive conclusions, but with caveats about the strength of the evidence in decentralization's favor. Manor ends his 1999 study noting that "while decentralization …is no panacea, it has many virtues and is worth pursuing", though the evidence in favor is "incomplete". Smoke asks whether there is empirical justification for pursuing decentralization and finds the evidence mixed and anecdotal. The lack of progress is striking.
Under closer examination this inconclusiveness is less surprising. Empirical work on decentralization can be divided into two broad groups: Qualitative (small sample) work, and Quantitative (large sample) work.
The former (e.g. Blanchard and Shleifer 2000 , Eaton 2004 , Parker 1995 , Slater 1989 , Treisman 1999 relying primarily on descriptive and qualitative evidence. This analysis is often careful, deep and nuanced.
But the methodology implies low levels of generality and an excess of variables over observations, making it difficult to control for exogenous factors. On the other hand, quantitative studies (e.g. de Mello 2000 , Fisman and Gatti 2000 , Huther and Shah 1998 , Rodden and Wibbels 2002 , and Zax 1989 , benefit from the high degree of generality, consistency and empirical transparency that statistical approaches provide. But they necessarily suffer problems with the quantification of nuanced concepts, and data comparability across diverse countries (or regions). The combination of such methodological difficulties with the widely varying definitions of "decentralization" adopted by different countries, often followed by poor or incomplete implementation of whatever definition is chosen (Boone 2003) , goes a long way toward explaining why empirical studies of both types have been unable to pin down its effects clearly.
I attempt to overcome these difficulties through a blend of qualitative and quantitative evidence that focuses on a single country, Bolivia, where decentralization was clearly defined and vigorously pursued. By combining deep insight into the causes of government quality in two extreme cases of municipal performance, with national results from all of the country's municipalities, we can approach the elusive goal of an explanation that has both generality and deep understanding. We can avoid problems of cross-country comparison (e.g. institutions, political regimes, idiosyncratic shocks) while still benefiting from the formal rigor of large-N studies. And we can retain a central focus on complex, nuanced explanatory factors -such as accountability, trust, and political entrepreneurialism -that are hard to treat with quantitative data alone. By bringing a large and varied amount of information to bear on a clearly defined problem, we hope to solve it.
I argue that the "outputs" of decentralization are simply the aggregate of local-level political and institutional dynamics. This is a significant departure from the bulk of the decentralization literature, which treats it as an essentially national phenomenon. This paper argues the opposite. Decentralization is a single reform that sets into motion a large number of largely independent local processes. Its effects are simply the sum of the effects of these local dynamics, which -as Wibbels (2003) has pointed out -inevitably diverge as 3 much as local conditions do. To understand decentralization we must first understand how local government works, 3 and in particular when it works well and when badly.
Hence this paper proposes a theory of local government that integrates a variety of well-established insights on the role of elections and lobbying in democratic politics with more recent ideas about civic organizations and social linkages. The model provides a structure in which economic interests, political actors, and civic organizations interact to make policy decisions. I derive predictions based on local characteristics, and then test them twice, first with qualitative, and then quantitative, evidence. Bolivia is particularly deserving of study because reform there consisted of a large change in policy at a discrete point in time. The data available are of surprising scope and quality for a country so poor, and include information on the political, social and civic, economic, institutional, and administrative characteristics of all of Bolivia's municipalities.
I define decentralization as the devolution by central (i.e. national) government of specific functions, with all of the administrative, political and economic attributes that these entail, to democratic local (i.e. municipal) governments which are independent of the center within a legally delimited geographic and functional domain. 4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theory of local government and derives predictions. Section 3 presents the qualitative methodology and discusses the quality of government in two extreme cases of local government performance. Section 4 tests the theory's predictions via close analysis of the economic, political and civic dynamics at work in each district. Section 5 tests whether the theory can explain the policy outputs of all Bolivian municipalities, using econometric models of public investment. Section 6 concludes.
A Theory of Local Government

Economy, Politics, Society
Elections do not establish a contract (explicit or implicit) between government and governed, nor do they set a specific policy agenda. This is due to two problems: political contracting, and cycling. The former, emerging from the incomplete contracts literature (e.g. Hart 1995, Hart and Moore 1990) , refers to the impossibility of writing a comprehensive platform that links politicians' actions to voters' policy preferences.
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Specific responses to all possible contingencies cannot be contracted for the simple reason that all possible contingencies cannot be foreseen. The latter, well-known problem of cycling in multidimensional space (Condorcet 1785 , Dodgson 1884 , Black 1948 , Mueller 1989 further limits elections' ability to convey information with anywhere near enough detail to inform specific policy decisions (Verba et al. 1993) . Hence elections serve instead to allocate control over governing institutions to the "team" (Downs 1957 ) most trusted by voters. Elections are about the allocation of power -power to take future decisions that affect society's welfare.
In this setting, local government is a hybrid. Its function is to produce local services and policies at the intersection of two quasi-market relationships and one organizational dynamic. Thus local government occurs at the confluence of two distinct forms of social interaction. Political parties and politicians are at the center of both quasi-markets. The first of these occurs between parties and individual voters. Following Schlesinger (1984) , this can be thought of as the primary, or retail, political market in which parties exchange ideas and declarations of principle for votes; parties compete with promises and ideas to attract voters, who vote for the party or candidate that inspires the most confidence. Such exchange is intrinsic to the nature of democracy.
The second market connects parties to private firms, producer associations, and other economic and issue-oriented interest groups. Following the pressure group politics work of Bentley (1908) , Finer (1997) and Truman (1951) , it can be thought of as a secondary, or wholesale, political market in which specific policies or entire policy bundles, as well as broader influence over legislators and the policy-making process, are sold to interest groups in exchange for money. The rationale for this market is derivative but compelling: even where they are all-volunteer organizations, political parties require resources to fund election campaigns and sustain party operations. And firms are interested in a continuing influence over government decisions and the policy environment in which they operate (Kitschelt 2000) . Such wholesale exchanges, combined with gifts from the faithful, are how parties finance themselves. 5 Ben-Zion and Eytan (1974) , Palda and Palda (1985) , Poole and Romer (1985) and many others, have tested the relationship between campaign contributions and policymaking empirically, with positive results.
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The second form of social interaction in local government involves civil society conceived as a collectivity or set of collectivities -as opposed to atomized individuals -and their relationship with the institutions of government. Where governance is concerned, local civil society operates as a complex of organizations. These aggregate preferences and represent community needs, mediate community participation in the production of certain services, facilitate social expression and the assertion of local identity, and enforce political accountability on the institutions of government. It is not useful to conceive of this interaction as a quasi-market, either internally or in its dealings with government, as its dynamics are not founded on buying and selling. It is rather a set of social organizations that generate their own norms of behavior and responsibility organically, and over time may develop stores of trust and credibility that enhance capacity, or may not (Putnam 1993 (Putnam , 2000 .
Local government depends on the relationships that collectively comprise civil society to elicit information necessary to the policy-making process, judge the efficacy of previous interventions, and plan for the future (Bardhan 1996) . Politicians also depend on these relationships to gauge public satisfaction with their performance between elections. The organizational dynamic of civil society is thus intrinsic to the process of local governance. Figure 1 illustrates how civil society combines with the political markets described above to give rise to local government. In this diagram, the political parties which are most successful in competing for votes and resources win control of government institutions. These institutions then enter into a separate, more complex interaction with civic organizations that features varying degrees of feedback and social participation. 
Local Characteristics, Local Dynamics
Now consider how the quasi-markets for policies and influence interact. Figure 1 suggests a political analogue of the neoclassical argument that open and competitive markets lead to efficient resource allocations.
Where a municipality's economic landscape is dominated by an economic hegemon, that hegemon can increase the efficiency of its political finance by focusing resources on the success of a single party.
Competing parties will find it difficult to finance their activities, and may be actively undermined by an abusive hegemon. Monopsony in the provision of political funds thus encourages monopoly in the party system.
In an open and competitive local economy, by contrast, a variety of economic actors with competing interests will tend to support a variety of political expressions. This in turn promotes a vigorous local politics, in which competition spurs policy innovation as parties vie to win both votes and financial backing.
Innovation happens when parties actively canvass local society, identifying pockets of voters, currents of opinion, or particular interests that are under-represented, and propose policies that respond to these and other changing voter needs. Policy innovation of this sort can be termed political entrepreneurship. As we shall see 7 below, vigorous local polities are characterized by a greater diversity of ideas and policy proposals competing for public favor, and hence a broader representation of the public's needs.
A direct result of this is improved public accountability for government officials, as opposition parties continuously search for advantage over their rivals. By contrast, the reduction in competition that characterizes political monopoly reduces the level of oversight that local government institutions are subject to, and may well leave sectors of the population unrepresented and effectively disenfranchised. Where an economic hegemon and a dominant political party collude abusively, the entire local governance system can be deformed to perverse ends, as happened in Viacha.
If a competitive party regime is the first condition of a local politics with accountability and broad representation, the second is an open and transparent electoral system. This refers to rules and mechanics of the electoral process, which serve to encourage or discourage the political engagement of the citizenry. These can have a decisive effect on turnout, and hence political outcomes, and so should be open, neutral and transparent. Systemic reforms which increase the transparency and ease of voting serve to increase participation by making voting both feasible and fair. This includes direct measures, such as permitting independent observers to inspect vote counts, as well as indirect measures, such as providing rural citizens with the identity papers needed to register to vote. Voters who are able to reach a polling center and cast a vote will be more likely to do so the less likely it is that results will be misrepresented or distorted by local interests.
Such reforms encourage citizens to express their political preferences freely, not just inside the voting booth but outside too. This in turn raises the electoral return to political entrepreneurship.
The insertion of civil society per se into the framework occurs after elections have been held, and a given political team has assumed control over the institutions of local government. In order for civil society to provide useful oversight and a feedback mechanism for the governing process, it must be able to identify a specific failing of local policy at the community level, formulate a coherent demand or complaint, and transmit it upwards to a level where it is advocated convincingly to policy-makers. Such abilities are not culturally or organizationally specific, and thus a wide variety of societies are likely to have them. But they will share four general traits that facilitate these tasks.
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The first is simply the ability to communicate, often across large areas and ethnically diverse groups.
The second is norms of trust and responsibility, both within and across communities as well as across time.
Where community leaders do not comply with their duties of leadership and advocacy, government will not reap the information it needs to right policy mistakes. Communities must then trust leaders farther up the hierarchy to accurately represent their interests before government, and leaders must trust that their information is correct. And civic leaders at the municipal level must then actively pursue communities' demands, if government is to be held accountable by communities.
The third trait is a minimum level of human capital amongst civic leaders such that those at the municipal level are able to interact productively with local government. This involves both cooperating with elected officials to advance policy goals, and opposing their decisions in such a way as to modify their actions.
The fourth trait is a minimum level of resources required to carry out these activities. Even if civic officials are unpaid, there remain unavoidable, non-trivial transaction costs associated with their activities.
In order for local government to be effective, it is important that the market relationships and logic of social representation described above counterbalance each other, and none dominate the others. A stable tension between the three elements creates a self-limiting dynamic in which the impulses and imperatives of interest groups can be contained within the bounds of political competition, and do not spill into the machinery of government nor erupt as civil strife. This is equivalent to allowing the economic, political and civic conditions outlined in the model above to obtain. Breaking this tension, on the other hand, can hobble government. Where the market for policies/votes is weak or missing, government will tend to be undemocratic; where the market for political influence is weak, underfunded parties may be unable to canvass voter opinion effectively, and government may be insensitive to economic conditions; and where society's civic organizations are weak, government will be lacking in information, oversight and accountability.
To state the problem another way, assume political agents are distributed along a continuum between "good" and "bad" extremes. What are the characteristics of municipalities where bad politicians gain control of public institutions? and where and why do good politicians prevail? Corrupt political agents will have far more opportunities to enrich themselves in municipalities where government oversight and accountability are crippled by economic monopoly, distorted political competition or deep-set social antagonisms. In districts where a stable tension between the economic, political and civil obtains, politicians will face strong incentives to satisfy voters' needs. Bad political agents will dedicate themselves to other pursuits or leave.
In the interplay between these three factors, the market for influence has the advantage of being a continuous process of exchange in which the priorities of economic interests are constantly brought to policymakers' attention. By contrast, the electoral dynamic is binding on local governors only intermittently at elections. This lower periodicity is balanced however by the severity of the potential consequences -the ejection of politicians from power. These imperatives are therefore somewhat balanced.
Under usual circumstances civil society is at a disadvantage. Despite having the most pervasive network of the three, the instruments which civic leaders can deploy to influence policy define the extremes of costs and consequences. In one hand they carry the relatively inexpensive tool of public complaint and admonishment, including encouraging the grass-roots to vote in a particular way. But experience indicates that this tool is weak against well-financed politicians with strong incentives to continue along a particular course.
In the other hand society carries the threat of demonstrations and civil disobedience, culminating in civil revolt.
This instrument is powerful indeed, but also very costly to deploy, and is only an effective threat when levels of social discontent are high.
The genius of Bolivian decentralization was to include civil society explicitly in the local governance process via Oversight Committees (OCs -see below). This additional instrument allows Bolivian society to level the playing field between the competing logics of market and representation intrinsic to local government.
But in doing so it increases the premium on social trust and responsibility, and the coherence of social organizations, which enable civil organizations to effectively represent their interests before government.
Local Government at the Extremes: Charagua vs. Viacha
Methodology
The model would appear to be a complete description of the local political economy. But is it useful for explaining government performance? Our first test uses detailed qualitative evidence from two extreme cases of local government performance in Bolivia. These emerge from a broader study, involving six months of field work in nine municipalities chosen to broadly represent Bolivia in terms of size, region, local economy, rural vs. urban setting, and cultural and ethnic characteristics. In each of these, a small research team conducted a systematic program of semi-structured and unstructured interviews of public and private leaders, key informants, and citizens at the grass-roots level. Interviews were carried out in the main city/town and throughout rural catchment areas. The majority of the interviews by number were with members and spokesmen of grass-roots organizations.
But let us first quickly review the institutional framework of local government in Bolivia. The Law of Popular Participation (LPP) stipulates that municipal councilmen be elected from party lists in singleconstituency elections. The council then elects the mayor indirectly from the top vote-getters. Bolivia's European-style, fragmented political culture, grafted onto an American-style presidential system, ensures that most municipal (and national) governments are coalitions.
Charagua
Located in the scrub grass and low twisted bushes of Bolivia's arid Chaco, Charagua's 60,000 km 2 make it larger than Costa Rica and twice the size of Belgium. One-eighth of its inhabitants live in Charagua town, with the rest scattered across 80 indigenous and rural communities. The economy is based on agriculture, cattle-ranching and a teacher-training college. Only cattle-ranching achieves a respectable scale, with a few families raising huge herds on tens of thousands of hectares. Most of Charagua's agricultural sector is pre-modern -communal lands farmed by Guaraní peasants who break the earth with their traditional stick method. The population of Charagua is overwhelmingly Guaraní. Townsfolk think of themselves as either white or mestizo, in strict opposition to Guaraní peasants. The town has no industry and little commerce. Its public services greatly surpass those of surrounding communities.
By mid-1997 Charagua had acquired a reputation for being well run. The mayor came top in a departmental ranking. "He is a very good administrator," said the Social Investment Fund's regional head.
"He has a very good image -even people from rival parties recognize this." 7 Councilmen were also judged hard-working, honest and effective, and villagers were pleased with the outcome of their work.
Decentralization had increased municipal resources by some 6500% year-on-year, and yet the funds appeared to be well-spent. Local government had managed to keep operating costs to just 4% of total budget. National government audits concurred (Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular 1997).
As did our research. Primary evidence abounds that local government in Charagua was of high quality. At a time when public disaffection with Bolivian politicians was high, dozens of hours of interviews with authorities and citizens from all walks of life produced not a single accusation of official corruption.
Grass-roots respondents from all over Charagua reported satisfaction with their local government, and felt that their concerns were being addressed. Working in concert with the municipal council and the OC, the mayor had implemented an investment planning system which authorities and villagers alike agreed was transparent, equitable, and highly participative. Projects resulting from this process pleased citizens because they responded to real needs and incorporated local concerns from the start. A wide range of public officials and 12 business and civic leaders agreed that municipal authorities were well-meaning and effective, and the quality of the services provided was high.
The foundation of good local government in Charagua was a political covenant in which the centerleft Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL) party allowed the Guaraní People's Association (APG) to choose its candidates and write important parts of its platform in exchange for Guaraní votes in municipal elections. The covenant was a success, and allowed the MBL -which had never done well in Charagua -to quadruple its share of the vote (Corte Nacional Electoral) and occupy the mayor's office.
The deeper background to Charagua's municipal dynamics is a Guaraní cultural renaissance which began in the early 1980s. Having survived Spanish colonialism for over three centuries, the Guaraníes succumbed throughout the 1800s to a potent mix of Christian conversion, land accumulation by cattle ranchers, and government annexations, all backed by the repression of the Bolivian army (Albó 1990, 19-22) .
With their spears and arrows the Guaraníes were no match for the firearms of the state, and at Kurujuky in 1892 an indigenous uprising led to a massacre which almost destroyed the Guaraní community. 8 Kurujuky cast Guaraníes onto the margins of society, where they survived as indebted slaves confined to vast estates, or subsistence farmers in isolated rural communities. They spent the better part of a hundred years in material and spiritual deprivation, a once proud and bellicose people lost in a sort of collective amnesia triggered by defeat (Medina 1994, 19-30) .
The 1980s witnessed a re-birth of Guaraní consciousness and Guaraní pride. The APG was formed in 1986-7 to coordinate Guaraní affairs, foment cooperation amongst communities, and articulate Guaraní interests. It essentially built upward levels of representation and voice onto existing Guaraní institutions of community self-government. The moment was ripe -aided by consensual decision-making and high levels of solidarity amongst Guaraníes, the APG flourished and quickly established a central role throughout the Guaraní world from mundane community tasks to regional and national affairs.
Viacha
Viacha squats under the fierce altiplano sun, a large rural municipality with a dusty, medium-sized city in one corner. By Bolivian standards it is wealthy, home to numerous textile and construction-related firms, as 13
well as a large bottling plant of the Cervecería Boliviana Nacional (CBN), Bolivia's largest brewery.
Municipal income is higher and more broadly based than most Bolivian cities. Yet by mid-1997 Viacha was a troubled town. After three consecutive electoral victories, the populist Unión Cívica de Solidaridad (UCS) party had lost its sheen in a hail of accusations of corruption and incompetence. Dozens of communities' investment requests went unsatisfied, yet the 1996 budget underspent by Bs.2 million. The participative planning process broke down as the city became polarized between groups supporting the mayor and those demanding his resignation.
Primary evidence from personal testimony, municipal accounts, and facts on the ground confirm that local government was of very poor quality. The institutions of government varied between ineffective and fully corrupt, producing policy outputs that were unsatisfying to local voters. There is substantial evidence that
Mayor Callisaya was inadequate as a manager. He expanded his payroll by over 100% without significantly increasing the municipality's administrative ability or technical skills. And he squandered huge sums of money on pet projects, like an unfinished, over-budget municipal coliseum; a high, twisting playground slide whose main panels soon began to fall off, threatening children with severe injury; and an expensive municipal sewerage system which exploded, throwing feces onto the streets of the city. Public officials, municipal councilmen, and even the mayor's political boss testified to Callisaya's corruption, and a national audit of municipal accounts charged him with malfeasance. The mayor's example spread throughout his administration, forming a web of corruption that enveloped the municipality.
Across the hall from the mayor's office, the municipal council readily admitted scarce knowledge of their own responsibilities, and displayed no interest in finding out. Respondents from across Viachan society considered them unsophisticated, unresponsive and easily manipulable. Increasingly their loyalties belonged to just one party. When opposition representatives began to question municipal policy, the UCS hired them and members of their family, and the criticism stopped. The situation of the OC was more dire. Viacha suffered two OCs -OC1, the "official" OC recognized by local and national governments, was uninformed and inert. Its president, recently arrived from distant Potosí, was unaware of the financial details of projects he had approved, and ignorant of basic facts like how many people the municipality employed, or how much it sent per year. Almost no one in the city knew who he was. The opposition OC2, by contrast and despite the mayor's efforts, was considerably more active and well-informed. Unrecognized by the national and local state, however, and excluded from official deliberations, OC2 was ultimately powerless to intervene.
The eructions of Viachan politics occur within a broader tide of urban migration which flows around and through the city. Perched on the edge of the La Paz-El Alto metropolis, Viacha is the first stop for many peasants fleeing the subsistence agriculture of the altiplano. Some move on but others stay, pushing the city's adobe neighborhoods farther and farther outwards. They take little pride in the traditions of a city that defines itself in opposition to the countryside; they stay, having found jobs in the capital, because the living is cheap. 
A Qualitative Test
Now abstract away from the proximate causes of government performance in order to understand the deeper currents at work in each. This section uses the theoretical tools developed above to analyze the contrasting fortunes of Viacha and Charagua. In so doing, we test how well the model can explain municipal performance.
The Local Economy
The economic differences between Charagua and Viacha are huge. In Viacha, the CBN played the role of monopsonistic, abusive provider of finance to the local political system. Even though the brewery comprised a considerably smaller share of the local economy than Charagua's ranchers, its single-minded exploitation of its resources and distribution network, combined with skillful political tactics, allowed it to dominate the city's political life to a remarkable degree. With fiercely partisan aggression, the CBN rallied its workers to man political rallies where beer was given away, mounted integrated ad campaigns for politics and beer, and pushed political propaganda through its distribution network. And it bribed, hired or intimidated other party leaders so as to neutralize opposition. 10 Beneath this lay a simple strategy designed to capture votes and promote the UCS-CBN brand. And so it generated, at least for a time, a political monopoly in which the UCS won elections repeatedly as the price of dissent rose.
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By contrast, Charagua's ranchers favored of a more diverse approach better suited to a pluralistic group of businessmen. Unlike the CBN, they were an association of entrepreneurs who did not face identical business conditions, and accordingly did not act politically or commercially with a single will. Cattle ranchers contributed to, and could be found in, all of Charagua's political parties. In this way they encouraged competition in the political system, and created conditions whereby entrepreneurship could flourish. In business also, ranchers helped Guaraní farming communities to drill wells, and gave non-members technical and veterinary assistance. And when their rivals won power, the ranchers found an accommodation.
Local Politics
Consider systemic issues first. In the 1980s and '90s Bolivia enacted a number of national reforms which improved the transparency, secrecy, and independent oversight of the voting process. Additional reforms simplified voter registration, increased the number of rural polling stations, and greatly extended rural literacy programs (especially amongst women). Their collective effects were a broad increase in voter registration and participation. Charagua provides a case study of this process. Registered voters increased by 72 percent between the 1993 and 1995 elections, and suffrage rose 139 percent.
The impact of these reforms were greatly multiplied by the decentralization program which followed soon after. The LPP redrew municipal boundaries so as to bring rural areas into the municipal system, and then devolved significant resources and political responsibility to them. Whereas before rural dwellers voted, if at all, for cantonal officials who had neither resources nor political power, now fully-fledged municipal governments with real authority were at stake. The prospect of controlling them drove political parties into the countryside in search of votes. The prospect of benefiting from them pushed villagers and farmers into municipal politics, and into the voting booth.
The reforms which opened politics to a new electorate also promoted fairness and openness. The old methods of bribery and intimidation could no longer be counted on. Proof is that an attempt to bribe an ADN councilman to confirm the MNR candidate as mayor failed because, given electoral transparency, the transaction would have been apparent and would have exposed the ADN to the voters' wrath. 11 In this political aperture, the parties that underwent comparable openings benefited most, and those which attemptedto carry on as before suffered. Thus the MBL, previously irrelevant in Charagua, struck a deal with the APG and captured the majority of new votes, while the MNR lost its pre-eminence and was thrown out of government.
The process was very different in Viacha. Although voter registration also increased, Viacha's gain of 22% was an order of magnitude lower than Charagua's. This reflected the fact that Viacha's politics remained closed to the concerns and priorities of the rural majority. This, in turn, was mostly due to the CBN, and in particular to the head of the local bottling plant, Juan Carlos Blanco. Blanco, a swearing bear of a man, threw all of the CBN/UCS' resources behind the effort to deliver large local majorities. He took the fused politicsand-beer strategy to comical lengths, and bribed and intimidated opposition parties into a meek submission.
The lamentable consequence was that the legal-electoral reforms detailed above were insufficient to counter the CBN-UCS' capture of local government. Under normal conditions, political competition and openness could be expected to catalyze a cleansing of the political system. But a substantive political choice is required for this mechanism to operate, and in Viacha there was none. The local political system was uncompetitive, unrepresentative and incapable of innovation. Voters offered a "choice" of the UCS or toothless, dormant alternatives eschewed politics altogether and dropped out of the system. Political oversight of government fell away, and the municipality became deeply corrupt.
Civil Society
The conspicuous differences between Viacha and Charagua extend to the social arena as well. In
Charagua the Guaraní majority form a large network of rural villages with homogeneous social characteristics and self-governing community structures. Townspeople, the other important group, had their own organizational structures, but proved pragmatic and willing to work with the Guaraní majority.
By contrast, Viachan civil society is a heterogeneous mix of groups with strong and divergent identities and a long history of mutual antagonism, marked by episodic outbreaks of violence. Rural Viacha is divided between the Machaqas in the west and the remainder, closer to the city. The former is a distinct region where the Aymará language predominates and communities are organized into traditional, pre-Columbian Ayllus and Mallkus. The latter see themselves as more modern, speak a mixture of Spanish and Aymará, andbase their social organization on the peasant union's general secretariats. Rural and urban worlds collide in the city's markets and peri-urban areas, and in adjacent rural communities, and the resulting frictions lead inevitably to social tensions.
It is easy to see why civil society was a significant benefit to local government in Charagua, and a significant liability in Viacha. Charagua benefited from a highly structured and coherent civil organization in which communication was fluid and norms of trust and responsibility strong. Through it civic and municipal authorities found it easy to stay in touch with local demand at the village level, as well as mobilize support for collective efforts. By promoting local authorities up through its hierarchy, the APG developed its own leaders internally. In Viacha, by contrast, civil society was functionally broken. Its constituent parts did not trust each other, and in many cases could not speak to each other. Government travesties in the countryside went unreported in the city, where civil authorities of all extractions ignored village requests. Civic leaders with proven effectiveness at the village level were overwhelmed by the scale and pressures of municipal government. With no budget of their own, and depending on official generosity for their sustenance in the city, they were easily neutralized as independent actors by government authorities. In Charagua, a civil society which functioned organically essentially took over local government and made it work. In Viacha, society was a bubbling cauldron of resentment and discontent, composed of people so mutually suspicious of each other as to make social oversight virtually impossible.
It is instructive to note that Charagua, while in some ways more homogeneous than Viacha, is itself a heterogeneous society, with its minority white, Mennonite, Quechua and Aymara populations. Even with a well-functioning APG, it would have been feasible for Guaraní politicians to assume authority and ignore or exploit rival ethnic groups. That they did not must in part be due to enlightened leadership. But it is also due to the value of fairness in such a district. The fact that Guaraníes form a majority of the population implies that the question of how to allocate public investment is essentially a problem of how to share out municipal resources amongst themselves. An investment scheme that produced unequal distributions would lead to strife amongst the Guaraníes, an outcome they would seek to avoid. Allocations that were fair amongst Guaraní communities but systematically lower for minority groups might be technically feasible, but would alienate criollo townspeople, along with the technical and financial resources they controlled.
In Olson's (2000) terms, there existed in Charagua an "encompassing interest" -i.e. one whose incentives were consistent with the growth of the collectivity. Viacha, on the other hand, had no encompassing interest, only narrow interests which sought to exploit power for the short-term gain of narrowly-defined groups. This explains why the role of history varies so much between the two districts. For centuries both had suffered from state oppression, extremes of inequality, and periodic outbursts of civil violence. Charagua's history was if anything more repressive and more cruel than Viacha's, leaving a potentially deeper reservoir of resentment. And yet it is in Charagua that the victims of oppression were able to overcome their past sufficiently to reach an accommodation with the urban elite, whereas in Viacha lingering social tensions contributed to government breakdown. In Charagua the group that stood to benefit most from government had an encompassing interest in its success. In Viacha, groups that lacked such interest fought for and abused municipal power to the point of disaster.
Summary and Postscript
Now apply the model directly. Charagua's political market was dominated by the rural Guaraní population, while economic power was overwhelmingly concentrated in cattle-ranchers' hands. But Charagua's civic organizations were also mostly run by the majority Guaraníes through the APG, an organization as structured and disciplined as it is legitimate in the eyes of most residents. There was thus a tension between competing sources of power in Charagua, which resulted in balanced government with substantial social participation.
In Viacha, monopoly in the market for political finance allowed the CBN/UCS to snuff out competition in the local political system. Civil society was divided along ethnic and historical lines, riven with hostilities and mistrust, which rendered its organizations incapable of cooperation, and so unable to engage with government institutions in any substantive way. Local government was thus crippled. Having mastered the quasi-market dynamics which give rise to government, the UCS was able to perpetuate its corrupt and 19 ineffective rule in the absence of any countervailing forces which might have moderated it or demanded accountability.
The model thus provides a succinct, coherent explanation of government quality in both districts. Its completeness is underlined by the final, extra-systemic denouement in Viacha. In late March of 1997, following a series of town meetings that aired their grievances, the people of Viacha rose up against their mayor. 12 On March 22 nd a crowd of several hundred people 13 marched through town, and then massed in the central square opposite Callisaya's office, loudly and angrily denouncing him. A few days later he resigned.
In the process of entrenching itself, the CBN/UCS had so comprehensively distorted the local political system that only a massive external shock could break its hold. The UCS had taken voters for fools, and the voters had had their revenge.
A Quantitative Test -National Evidence
The model appears to work well at a small-N level of analysis. But does it have more general implications? We turn now to a large-N database in search of broader support. If, as argued above, the outcomes of decentralization really are just the aggregation of the hundreds of local processes that it sets into motion, then the theory should also help us understand the national results of decentralization in Bolivia. Faguet (2004) shows that decentralization caused important policy changes in Bolivia: public investment shifted from economic infrastructure to social services and human capital formation, and resources were distributed much more equally across space. Faguet finds further evidence that local government was more responsive to local needs, but does not explain how this came about. Can our model explain these outcomes?
Methodology
We test the model's predictions with an original database that marries investment data for all of Bolivia's municipalities during the decade 1987-1996 with a rich set of indicators of local institutional and decision-making characteristics. My theory explains local policy outcomes in terms of the interplay between economic, political, and civil society forces, and proposes that good government requires a stable tension between all three. Hence the econometric test that follows seeks to explain municipal policy outputs -in this 20 case investment decisions -as a function of specific indicators of (i) competition in the local economy; (ii) openness and entrepreneurialism in local politics; and (iii) the strength and resilience of civic organizations.
An ideal test of the theory would use a measure of good government as the dependent variable. But there is no obvious natural measure, and constructing one for Bolivia's 311 municipalities is operationally fraught. So I use local investment decisions instead.
I separate municipal investment flows by sector, and for each sector estimate the model
where G is aggregate investment per capita in the public good, E is a scalar measure of private sector dynamism, P is a scalar of political disaffection and protest (i.e. stagnant, uncompetitive politics -the opposite of entrepreneurialism), C is a scalar of civil society's strength and organization, S is a scalar or (usually) vector of the existing stock of public goods of that type (variously defined) at an initial period, and Z is a vector of demographic, regional, and institutional controls, all subscripted by municipality. My use of the E, P, C and Z terms follows Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) , and Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts (1987) assume that E, P, C, S and Z are constant over these five years. I reduce the large number of potential E, P, C and Z variables to a manageable and conceptually coherent set through principal component analysis. This produces one indicator each for E, P and C, and seven dimensions of Z. The E, P and C indicators are summarized in figure 2 (and explained in detail in the appendix). 
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The main coefficients of interest are α, β and γ, corresponding to the economic, political and civic factors that underpin local governance. There is no reason to expect any of these three determinants to be systematically positive or negative across different sectors. To the contrary, signs are likely to vary with sector.
On the other hand, the model underlines the importance for effective government of a tension between these factors. Hence I interpret significance in these terms, plus differing signs -without predicting which will be positive and which negative -as strong national support for the theory. Significant coefficients of the same sign would imply that the structure given above is misspecified; and the absence of significance would imply that the entire model is wrong. Lastly, I use coefficient ζ to characterize central and local investment patterns according to need, where "need" is defined as the marginal utility arising from a particular type of public service, N=U´(g). This is based on an assumption of the decreasing marginal utility of a public service as the level of provision of that service increases. Hence need falls as the stock of g rises, and vice versa.
Results
I examine investment patterns in health, education and urban development, three important sectors which together account for 64 percent of all local investment. I present separate models of investment under central and local government in order to explain decisions under each regime. For the sake of comparability, I
estimate pre-decentralization models with the same E, P, C and Z variables used for the post-decentralization models. But it is the detail in the latter that interests us most, given that the local dynamics theorized above did not exist before 1994 by definition. Interpreting the magnitude of PCV coefficients is extremely difficult, hence I focus on the significance of coefficients, and their signs.
Health
Private sector and civil institution variables are significant in both models of local government, with different signs. This indicates a tension between these two forces -where each is present, it successfully lobbies local government to increase/decrease health investment. The political protest variable is insignificant.
Need variables are significant in both models. Investment rises with indicators of need, although in the neediest municipalities there appears to be a poverty trap. Thus, investment increases with the malnourishment 22 rate, 15 and is also higher where public facilities and those run by public insurers are used intensively. But investment is lower where the proportion of the population that receives no health care is high. I interpret this to mean that local government responds to demand for local health services, as well as to indicators of poor public health. But where very few health care services exist, people may be ignorant about their benefits and not demand health investment, leading local government to invest less. Investment is also progressive in economic terms -health investment increases as wealth and income fall, and as family size and poverty measures rise. This is the opposite of the usual pattern, where wealthier municipalities invest more.
Figure 3
Health (dependent variable: per capita investments in health) estimation with robust standard errors; z-stats in parens. PCVn = nth pricipal component variable *, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Central
Model Local
YES YES YES
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Central government behaved differently. Of the five indicators of need used to estimate central investment, only one -the percentage of households using NGO or church-run health facilities -is significant in one of the models. 16 Its positive sign indicates that investment increased where private (i.e. non-public 17 ) medical facilities already exist, which in Bolivia is where public facilities are also in abundance. 18 This implies an increasing geographic concentration of infrastructure. The insignificance of the other four indicators implies that central government investment was insensitive to need, or at most weakly regressive.
Education
As in health, local government investments rise where civil institutions are stronger, and fall where the private sector is dynamic and organized. This signals the existence of a healthy tension amongst the key groups that underpin local governance, with different groups lobbying for the sorts of investment that interest them most. Investment also rises with two measures of illiteracy, implying that local government is sensitive to local needs. The presence of local health authorities is also significant here, but now positive as we would expect. Lastly, investment rises as wealth and income fall, making local education investment economically progressive.
Central investment in education is not related to need. Interestingly, the presence of a local educational authority caused investment to fall under central government. This suggests that the center went perversely out of its way to deny resources to those districts where sectoral authorities operated.
Figure 4
Education (dependent variable: per capita investments in education) Tobit estimation with robust standard errors; z-stats in parens. PCVn = nth pricipal component variable *, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Model Central Local
YES YES YES
Urban Development
Very few municipalities received any investment in urban projects before 1994, with only 24 non-zero Tobit estimation with robust standard errors; z-stats in parens. PCVn = nth pricipal component variable + Defined as other than football fields, multi-use courts and coliseums *, **, *** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Model Central Local
YES YES YES YES YES YES
Under decentralization, all five variables of need are significant and positive. This implies a regressive pattern, in which local government invests less where existing infrastructure is scarce. The economic variables, significant and strongly regressive, tell a similar story: investment rises as wealth and income rise, and falls where poverty is greater. As we would expect, investment rises with the number and dynamism of private sector firms, which I ascribe to firms lobbying for the type of projects (i.e. contracts) that benefit them. It is notable that the variable for political disaffection and protest is significant and negative. Given the overall pattern of investment, this implies that voters are successful in at least partially reducing resource flows to a 26 sector in which investment is generally regressive and largely benefits firms. This describes a healthy local political economy in which different interests compete for resources, and -crucially -voters and non-business interests can affect policy decisions. Urban development is one of the most important categories of municipal investment post-1994, and hence this is a significant result.
Urban development is the only sector in which central government seems to have invested progressively in terms of need. But only one of the five indicators of need is significant in one of the models, and hence the evidence is weak. Economic variables are not significant.
Summary
Measures of private sector dynamism, uncompetitiveness in the political system, and the strength and organization of civil society are important for explaining policy decisions across the three sectors. Local firms successfully lobby for lower investment in health and education in districts with a vigorous private sector in order that more resources may be devoted to urban development, a sector which offers them many more lucrative contracts than training farmers or refurbishing schools. And civil organizations, representing civil society via neighborhood organizations, rural syndicates and other grass roots groups, succeed in getting local government to increase investment in health and education, their areas of presumed highest priority. The fact that the variable for political disaffection and protest enters negatively in the model of urban development, where investment is strongly regressive both economically and in terms of need, suggests a healthy picture of local democracy in which voters are able to influence local government through both their civil institutions and the electoral mechanism. Where local government works well, even the poorest citizens have voice and may participate in the policy debate, providing an effective counterweight to the power of private firms and government's own politico-bureaucratic interests.
The evidence further shows how decentralization changed the policy regime from one where central government at best ignored local needs, and perhaps even exacerbated them, to one where local government invests more where need is greater. Central investments appear blind to need in education and urban development, and may have been regressive in health. Local governments, by contrast, invest progressively in terms of need in health and education. The fact that local investment was economically progressive in health 27
and education as well increases confidence in these findings. Given the overall results, a sensitivity of local government to real local needs is not surprising. The competitive interplay of economic, political and civic forces ensures that politicians are well informed about social preferences. And binding mechanisms exist to ensure accountability.
Conclusion
Qualitative information set out above provides rich and convincing evidence that our theory can indeed explain the quality of government in Viacha and Charagua. Quantitative evidence from the universe of Bolivian municipalities constitutes a less detailed, but much more extensive and general argument that the model can explain municipal behavior throughout the country. By weaving the two strands together, we can achieve a higher-order empirical test of the theory than either alone can achieve.
The theory proposes that local government occurs at the intersection of two quasi-market relationships and one organizational dynamic. The quality of municipal decision-making is intimately bound up with the nature of competition amongst local economic actors, the openness and competitiveness of local politics, and the coherence and organizational capacity of civil society. Effective, accountable government relies on a rough balance between these three elements, each a form of local power. Where one element is compromised in some way, the dynamics that feed into local decision-making become unbalanced, and local policy will suffer a variety of deformations.
Hence we saw how in Viacha a dominant CBN, acting as monopsonistic provider of finance to the local party system, was able to stamp out political competition, ultimately driving voters away from the polls.
A mutually suspicious civil society divided between urban and rural, and again between traditional and modern peasant communities, lacked the organizational capacity to counter this pernicious influence. And so local government became unaccountable, ineffective and corrupt. In Charagua, by contrast, heterogeneous cattle ranchers comprised a competitive private sector, which nurtured competition and entrepreneurialism in politics. This led to political accountability, and hence responsive, equitable policies, themselves informed and abetted by a coherent and highly organized civil society given shape in the APG.
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In less detail, but on a much larger scale, these results are mirrored nationwide. A test of policymaking in all of Bolivia's municipalities shows the importance of a competitive local economy, an open and entrepreneurial local politics, and the strength and resilience of civic organizations, in explaining patterns of municipal investment in the three most important sectors. And the coefficients' signs point to a healthy tension amongst competing political actors, each pressing public officials for the sorts of investment that benefit them most. In districts where civic organizations are strong, municipalities spend more on health and education.
These are also districts where indicators of need are strongest, implying that civic groups lobby for what they need most. Where there is a dynamic private sector, by contrast, municipalities tend to invest less in education and health, and more in urban development -by nature a sector of more expensive, capital-intensive projects.
But this last tendency is checked through the political system, where disaffection and protest serve to drive invested amounts back down.
The combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence provides support for the model of local government set out above that is not only analytically deep and detailed, but also broad. The model holds not only for two obscure towns, but for the whole of Bolivia. Indeed, it is crucial for understanding the effects of decentralization more generally. The 1994 reform made government more responsive by re-directing public investment to areas of greatest need, and more equitable by shifting resources towards poorer districts. How precisely did it achieve these things?
Decentralization worked by creating local authorities beholden to local voters. Through this it opened the institutional space in which local economic, political and civil dynamics could directly affect policy. It put real power over public resources in the hands of ordinary citizens throughout the national territory. This changed not only the form of government in Bolivia, but also its substance. Before 1994, the relatively few central officials stationed beyond national and regional capitals had little incentive to concern themselves with local demands. Career success was determined by ministerial fiat unrelated to local outcomes in distant districts. Business interests and the rich might eventually hope to gain some favors from the center, but ordinary citizens' ordinary concerns received little hearing. After 1994, the fate of local officials was made 29 dependent on local voters, and voters' welfare dependent in turn on the accountability they were able to impose on their politicians.
As both Viacha and Charagua illustrate, independent civic organizations were important to this change, transmitting information, overseeing politicians' actions, and enforcing accountability. The fact that decentralization engaged thousands of neighborhood councils, peasant communities, allus and mallkus, which previously had little voice in how their districts were run, was critical to its success nationwide. By locating real resources and political power in municipal institutions, it reached out to all strata of society, offering them the means to improve their lives and concrete incentives to participate.
The experience of decentralization in Bolivia underlines a deeper point which is denied by some of decentralization's foes, but which is nonetheless true. The poor as a rule are ignorant, but they are not stupid.
They know what they want, and the things they want are by and large good for them. They can ill afford otherwise. Decentralization succeeded in Bolivia because it created more Charaguas than Viachas. It put significant power and resources in the hands of decent, ordinary people, who then made good choices. Such a conclusion is not hopelessly naïve. It is the essence of democracy. 
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